Since the 80's, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policymakers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free-riding on innovations.
maximize the rents of those with access to the government decision-making process... [I] t means that the government will cartelize economic activity in favor of politically influential parties. In rare cases the government designs and enforces a set of rules of the game that encourage productive activity."
The $200-billion industry not only has access to the government's decision-making process, 6 but it is indeed so politically influential that "PhRMA [the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America], this lobby, has a death grip on Congress", in the words of Senator Richard J. Durbin. 7 This political influence potentially comes from the impressive amount of the industry's lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions. For example, the industry's total expenditure on lobbying from 1998 to 2006
was $1,087 million, and total campaign contributions amount to $139 million during the election cycles from 1990 to 2006. 8 In fact, given the nature of the industry, it is easy to understand that it is in the drug companies' best interest to have access to the policymakers, who can easily return favors at low political costs. For a blockbuster (a drug that has sales of over a billion dollars a year), an extension of the patent's effective lifetime for a few years could be extremely profitable given the usually negligible marginal cost of production for drugs.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis on this phenomenon by taking as a premise the hypothesis that campaign contributions are for the purpose of buying legislative influence. In particular, it incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth model to analyze the political-economic tradeoff facing the policymakers, who have to balance between the optimal level of patent protection to maximize social welfare on one hand and the interests of the special interest group 6 The figure of $200 billion refers only to how much Americans spent on prescription drugs in 2002, and it does not include the other large expenses on drugs administered in hospitals, nursing homes, or doctors' offices. Combining all these expenses, the industry's revenue is roughly $400 billions in 2002. See, e.g. Angell (2005, p. 4-5 (SIG) in exchange for campaign contributions on the other. 9 It is analytically shown that the government placing a higher value on campaign contributions increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the amount of monopolistic profits; (c) the market value of patents; and (d) R&D investments. These results are consistent with the data in Section 2. Furthermore, this paper derives a unique level of the government's bargaining power above which the amount of campaign contributions increases with respect to the weight that the government places on campaign contributions.
In terms of welfare implications, it is not surprising and perhaps trivial that the presence of a SIG lobbying the government to distort the level of patent protection is socially undesirable in a closedeconomy setting. However, in a multi-country setting, the presence of a SIG lobbying its own government in each country may improve social welfare because the level of patent protection in the multi-country Nash equilibrium without lobbying is suboptimally low due to the positive externality of international spillovers in innovations suggested by previous studies, such as Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) . Therefore, the multi-country political equilibrium features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and the detrimental effects of international free-riding on innovations, and the finding of potential welfare gains arises from the SIGs increasing the level of patent protection from a globally suboptimal level and acting as an externality-correcting device. In addition, the pharmaceutical lobby may even improve the welfare of the consumers, who do not own any patent, when the degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough. Finally, this paper shows that if the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country, in which the government places a higher value on campaign contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss.
This paper relates to four strands of literature: (a) political economy of trade policy, (b) political economy and economic growth; (c) the welfare effects of lobbying; and (d) international patent protection. Feenstra (2004, chapter 9 ) provides a comprehensive discussion on the political economy of trade policy. An elegant formulation of special interest politics and trade policy is provided by Grossman and Helpman (1994) , who later develop a set of modeling tools on special interest politics in Grossman and Helpman (2001) , from which this paper borrows to analyze patent policy. Drazen (2000, chapter 11) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14) provide a comprehensive discussion on political economy and economic growth. The literature has so far focused on the relations between economic growth and a number of issues, such as income inequality through redistributive policies, political institutions through property rights, and the adoption of new technology through the distribution of technological-vintagespecific human capital. This paper provides a theoretical analysis on economic growth and the political economy of patent policy on one hand and analyzes the welfare effects of lobbying on the other. Recent studies on the welfare effects of lobbying, such as Besley and Coate (2001) and Coate and Morris (1999) ,
analyze the negative effects of lobbying on social welfare arising from coordination failures between multiple SIGs, the excessive entry of citizens into running for office, and the implementation of Pareto dominated policies due to the fear of lobbying-driven hysteresis in policy decisions.
In the literature on international patent protection, Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of the TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding growth model. In contrast, the current paper develops a multi-country quality-ladder growth model to analyze international patent protection and the political-economy aspects of patent policy. Dinopoulous et al (2005) analyze international patent protection using a North-South quality-ladder model. In their model, the level of patent protection is an exogenous parameter, and they are interested in the effects of patent protection on long-run growth and technology transfer; on the other hand, in the current paper, the level of patent protection is a policy instrument chosen by the government to maximize its objective function. Furthermore, the current paper incorporates special interest politics into the growth model to analyze the welfare implications of a pharmaceutical lobby. Lai (2005) extends the variety-expanding model in Grossman and Lai (2004) to analyze the effects of political contributions on the level of patent protection and shows insufficient patent protection prior to the TRIPS agreement. The current paper complements and extends Lai (2005) by taking insufficient patent protection as a starting point and by investigating whether the increasing political influence of the pharmaceutical lobby has improved social welfare. In addition, the current paper considers the welfare implications under both symmetric and asymmetric SIGs.
Before closing the introduction, I briefly discuss two common critiques against the hypothesis of campaign contributions as political investments. The first one is the small amount of campaign contributions relative to the potential financial returns at stake. Helpman and Persson (2001) provide an interesting model to show that a small amount of contributions does not necessarily imply that it has no effects on policy outcomes. In their model, lobbying has important influences on policy outcomes and the equilibrium amount of contributions is as small as zero because of the competition between legislators.
The other common critique is that individuals are the main source of money in US campaigns. Based on this observation, Ansolabehere et al (2003) argue that campaign contributions should be considered as consumption goods rather than political investments. However, this argument does not rule out the possibility that SIGs contribute in order to influence the policymakers on certain policies. Ansolabehere et al (2003) The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts about the pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 describes the model and presents the theoretical results. The final section concludes. Some of the proofs are contained in Appendix A. Table 2 presents the details of the extension in the commercial lifetime of patent and market exclusivity for drugs as a result of the policy changes during the 80's and 90's. Note that the effects captured in Table 2 underestimates the true extension of monopoly rights for brand-name drugs because they do not take into account the fact that the companies could strategically utilize the market exclusivity provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act to protect a new generation of slightly-modified products. To summarize, the data presented so far is consistent with the hypothesis that the pharmaceutical industry has successfully exercised its political power, which comes from lobbying and campaign contributions, to influence the policymakers in order to strengthen patent protection for brand-name drugs. The next question is whether these policy changes have led to handsome financial returns for the industry. Motivated by the data presented above, the theoretical model in Section 3 attempts to achieve the following analytical results to confirm the basic intuition of the model. An increase in the value that the government places on campaign contributions in its objective function should lead to an extension in the patent length for brand-name drugs, and consequently an increase in the amount of monopolistic profits generated by the industry and the market value of patents. In addition, the model predicts that R&D investments on pharmaceuticals would increase. Table 4 shows that this is also true in the data. Private 11 This proxy is a rough approximation at best for two reasons: (a) it includes other items, such as trade secrets, trademarks, and goodwill; and (b) the accounting valuation methods may not accurately reflect the market value.
SOME STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
R&D spending on drugs in real terms has been increasing at an average annual growth rate of 7.28% since the 80's. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 3,494 3,946 4,445 4,897 4,997 5,135 5,595 6,473 7,015 7,251 8,225 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 9,182 10,332 10,664 11,078 10,410 12,143 13,025 12,502 12,854 9,899 13,614 Data source: National Science Foundation -Division of Science Resources Statistics Footnote: R&D is net of Federal spending. 
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A QUALITY-LADDER GROWTH MODEL WITH SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS
The quality-ladder growth model originates from Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , in which scale effects are eliminated by assuming decreasing individual R&D productivity as in Segerstrom (1998) . 12 The basic framework is modified to introduce: (a) patent protection in the form of patent length; and (b) an organized SIG representing the owners of pharmaceutical patents. The model is further modified to include homogenous goods and quality-enhancing goods (i.e. pharmaceuticals).
Sections 3.1 -3.4 firstly present the different components of the model in a closed-economy setting, and then the decentralized equilibrium is defined in Section 3.5. After characterizing the socially optimal patent length, lobbying is incorporated into the model by assuming that the government values campaign contributions in addition to social welfare. As a result, the SIG is able to distort the level of patent protection to benefit itself. The comparative static result shows that an increase in the importance of campaign contributions in the government's objective function increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the amount of monopolistic profits; (c) the market value of patents; and (d) R&D investments. Finally, the different welfare implications of lobbying are derived under the closed-economy and multi-country settings with symmetric and asymmetric SIGs.
12 See, e.g. Jones (1995a) and Jones (1999) for a discussion of scales effects in R&D-driven endogenous growth models. After eliminating scale effects, the resulting model becomes the so-called semi-endogenous growth model, in which the growth rate along the balanced-growth path is proportional to the labor-force growth rate. An increase in the share of R&D workers raises the level of technology while holding its balanced-growth rate constant.
HOUSEHOLDS
There is a continuum of households indexed by
, and their lifetime utility function is
is the per capita consumption of homogenous goods, and it is chosen as the numeraire. β is a preference parameter reflecting the importance of the per capita consumption of quality-enhancing goods, is the exogenous population growth rate. ρ is the subjective discount rate. To ensure that utility is bounded,
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints
(
Each member of a household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn a wage income t w . t r is the real rate of return on the financial assets, which represent the market value of patents in equilibrium. The quasi-linear preference enables me to derive the patent length in the political equilibrium with a minimal assumption of efficient bargaining between the government and the SIG. 14 In this setting, the identity of the two types of households is exogenously imposed. In fact, this identity can be endogenously derived by assuming an exogenous difference in the discount rates across the two types of households along with a borrowing constraint. Then, the households who have a lower discount rate would be the owners of financial assets in equilibrium.
This setup leads to a conflict of interest between the patent owners (i.e. Type-I households) who benefit from an increase in the rate of return on R&D investments and the consumers (i.e. Type-II households) who don't, and this conflict of interest gives rise to the importance of political economics.
From Type-I households' intertemporal optimization, the Euler equation derived from the quasilinear preference equates the rate of return on financial assets to the subjective discount rate such that
The intratemporal optimality condition determines the amount of spending on the quality-enhancing goods in each period to be 
and the familiar aggregate price index is
The first-order condition for differentiated drug
HOMOGENOUS GOODS
There exists a larger number of competitive firms producing the homogenous goods t h Y , . The production function has constant returns to scale in labor input
(8)
The marginal cost of production is
Since the homogenous goods are chosen to be the numeraire and this sector is characterized by marginalcost pricing, the marginal cost is also one. Therefore, the real wage is given by
, and the market-
where t h C , is the total consumption of homogenous goods.
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Within the pharmaceutical industry, there is a continuum of sub-industries on the unit interval producing 
Assumption 2: Entrepreneurs can only invest in R&D to develop a better drug after the latest patent in the sub-industry has expired.
When a patent expires, the monopolistic sub-industry temporarily becomes a generic sub-industry characterized by marginal-cost pricing until the next innovation occurs. Therefore, extending the statutory patent life has two opposing effects on social welfare. On one hand, it enhances the incentives for R&D by raising the present value of the stream of profits earned by a monopolistic leader. On the other hand, it increases the dead weight loss by increasing the fraction of monopolistic sub-industries due to a longer period of patent protection. At the constrained social optimum, the government balances these opposing effects to maximize social welfare.
The production function in sub-industry j is
is the number of workers hired by sub-industry j at time t. . The familiar Bertrand-equilibrium price is
Thus, the monopolistic leader charges a markup of z over the marginal cost, and the equilibrium profit is
-13 - (13) into (6), the aggregate price index for pharmaceuticals becomes
Substituting (16) into (4) 
. The first-order condition from (7) implies that the ratio of relative labor inputs in the monopolistic and generic sub-industries is
. Therefore, the index of effective labor inputs can be re-expressed as
, and the number of workers in monopolistic sub-industry
which is the same across all monopolistic sub-industries and increases over time as the total population grows. The total amount of monopolistic profit is
Finally, the actual number of workers employed in the pharmaceutical industry is
which increases over time at the population growth rate.
R&D
The no-arbitrage value of a pharmaceutical patent t V for a new successful innovation at time t is the present value of the stream of profits earned by the R&D entrepreneur who becomes the next industry leader until the patent expires. From (19), 
where t ϕ is the individual R&D productivity parameter that the entrepreneur takes as given. The R&D sector is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The expected profit earned by
The first-order condition is
which is the key condition that determines the number workers allocated to the R&D sector.
To eliminate scale effects, the individual R&D productivity parameter t ϕ at time t is assumed to be decreasing in the level of technology t A such that
where 
.
BALANCED-GROWTH PATH
Along the balanced-growth path, t r L , increases at the population growth rate (to be shown below). Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of technology for pharmaceuticals denoted by g must be proportional to the population growth rate such that 
Substituting (20) and (29) 
The per capita supply of homogenous goods is
From the budget constraints, the steady-state per capita consumption of homogenous goods is
Therefore, the following parameter restriction is sufficient to ensure an interior solution for both types of households β α > .
(A3) ) ( ) ( I a n − ρ is the amount of dividends received by each member of Type-I households, and the total value of financial assets owned by Type-I households equals the market value of all existing patents.
From (21), the market value of a pharmaceutical patent that has a remaining life time of τ years is
Therefore, the market value of all existing patents in the monopolistic industries is
where
To see the conflict of interests across the two types of households, differentiating 
Note that
. An increase in T has three effects on the welfare of each household. (36) and (37) indicate the asymmetric effect coming from the increase in the value of patents that benefits only the patent owners. The two symmetric effects as shown in (17) are the negative effect of markup-pricing distortion and the positive effect of a higher level of pharmaceutical technology.
DESIRED PATENT LENGTHS FOR PATENT OWNERS AND CONSUMERS
Given the equilibrium conditions, the lifetime utility for each type of households along the balanced growth path can be derived by rewriting (1) (36) and (37). 19 The conclusion briefly discusses the generality of a steady-state welfare analysis that ignores transition dynamics.
Intuitively, the patent owners have a longer desired patent length than the consumers because of the asymmetric ownership of patents as financial assets whose market value increases in patent length. This setup leads to a conflict of interest across the two types of households and gives rise to the potential role of the pharmaceutical lobby influencing the government's policy choice through campaign contributions.
OPTIMAL PATENT LENGTH
A benevolent government chooses the patent length to maximize social welfare subject to the equilibrium conditions. Social welfare is defined as
The first-order condition that characterizes the optimal patent length is
Denote the solution to (44) 
The sign of (45) is given by
To ensure that the second-order condition is satisfied for a maximum, the following assumption is (42) and (44).
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
This subsection employs the modeling tools in Grossman and Helpman (2001, chapter 7) to model campaign contributions for legislative influence. In addition to social welfare, the government is assumed to value campaign contributions, denoted by 0 C , and its objective function is a weighted average of
is the weight that the government places on campaign contributions. The pharmaceutical lobby and the government are assumed to engage in efficient bargaining and be able to commit to the bargaining outcome on patent length and campaign contributions. The quasi-linear preference enables me to derive the political-equilibrium patent length without imposing further assumptions on the bargaining process.
21
The efficient bargaining outcome on the patent length can be derived from the constrained maximization problem ) , (
≥ − θ for some value of Û . It is in the government's best interest to choose the highest possible 0 C to make this inequality constraint binding. Therefore, the constraint can be re-expressed as
20 Helpman (2001, chapter 10) and (2002, chapter 2) show that this objective function represents a proper reduced form of a model with electoral competition. 21 Although the political-equilibrium patent length can be determined, the amount of campaign contributions cannot be determined unless further assumptions are imposed on the bargaining process. See Proposition 2.
-22 -After substituting (48) into (47) and dropping the constant term, the constrained maximization becomes
In other words, when the government values campaign contributions, the pharmaceutical lobby is able to alter the relative weight that the government places on the households' welfare. In particular, a higher value that the government places on campaign contributions leads to a larger relative weight that the government places on Type-I households' welfare. The first-order condition that characterizes the political-equilibrium patent length, denoted by
Comparing (44) and (50) Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) show that the Nash-equilibrium level of patent protection in a multi-country setting is suboptimally low because each country has the incentive to free ride on other countries' innovations. Therefore, when all countries act according to their best response functions in choosing the level of patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium patent length is much shorter than the global optimum. This is a realistic description of the real world because innovations occur worldwide. At least, innovations come from multiple industrial countries. Therefore, the closed-economy setting is now extended to a multi-country setting in order to compare the different welfare implications.
WELFARE ANALYSIS IN CLOSED VS. OPEN ECONOMY
The theoretical result is that the pharmaceutical lobbies may improve social welfare in the multi-country setting by increasing the patent length from a globally suboptimal level.
There are N symmetric countries. For simplicity, transportation costs are assumed to be zero, and there is no international lending and borrowing as commonly assumed in the literature to pin down a unique trade pattern. When an R&D entrepreneur has an innovation success, she obtains a patent in each country. Therefore, in addition to the stream of monopolistic profits from the domestic economy, she is also entitled to the profits from abroad. At the aggregate level, these transfers of monopolistic profits for patent services are balanced by an equal value of trade in homogenous goods. The symmetry assumption implies that each country owns an equal fraction of patented innovations in the world.
The two equilibrium concepts for the open-economy model are as follows. (44) 
The statutory patent length in country s is denoted by 
The first implicit assumption behind (54) 
Using the balanced-growth path condition, the multi-country analog of (40) is
(55) and (56) 
which reveals the other key difference that an unilateral increase in 
By imposing symmetry, the condition that characterizes the symmetric Nash-equilibrium patent length NE T simplifies to
Lemma 3: The Nash-equilibrium patent length is decreasing in N and is strictly below the symmetric globally optimal patent length when the number of countries is at least two.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the case of special interest politics, the SIG best response function (52) of country
The condition that characterizes the symmetric political-equilibrium patent length
Proposition 3: When
, and ςˆ is increasing in N . Furthermore, for any given
Proposition 3 shows that the pharmaceutical lobbies may improve social welfare when the level of patent protection is not chosen optimally by the government such as in the case of a multi-country Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition of Proposition 3 in a two-country setting. Furthermore, the pharmaceutical lobby may even improve the welfare of the consumers (i.e. Type-II households) when the degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough.
Proposition 3 also shows that in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may improve the social welfare of each country. However, if the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country, in which the government places a higher value on campaign contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Proposition 4 proves this statement in a two-country setting. 
CONCLUSION
Since the 80's, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence, which potentially comes from lobbying and campaign contributions. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth model to analyze the policymakers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting the level of patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting. However, in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may improve the social welfare of each country. If the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country that has a more politically influential SIG would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss. It remains as an empirical question as to whether the pharmaceutical lobby in the US is more or less politically influential than its foreign counterparts.
Before closing the paper, I briefly discuss the generality of the steady-state welfare analysis. The transition dynamics is omitted for analytical tractability; however, the theoretical predictions should be robust for two reasons. Firstly, the government may want to maximize social welfare that includes the transition dynamics. So long as there is a positive externality in patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium patent length is globally suboptimal. Thus, an increase in patent length due to political influences may still improve social welfare. Secondly, the resource reallocation from production to R&D as a result of increasing patent protection does not necessarily lead to short-run consumption losses. 22 In this case, improving steady-state welfare would be sufficient to improve social welfare.
22 E.g. Chu (2007) shows that this result holds true over a range of parameters in a model with capital accumulation. Proof: The welfare of the government is firstly rescaled so that one dollar for the government has the same utility weight as one dollar for the SIG. Dividing (47) by ς ,
The total surplus of the government and the SIG at
Differentiating (a2) with respect to T yields
Multiplying (a3) by ς and substituting (44) into (a3) yields the same first-order condition as (50). From Assumption 3, the amount of surplus captured by the government is TS
Rearranging some terms, (a4) becomes
Differentiating (a5) with respect to ς yields 
Thus, there must exist a 
Therefore, the maximum amount that the SIG is willing to pay as campaign contributions is the amount for which it is indifferent between
Since the government has the first-mover advantage, it would make an offer to the SIG such that the participation constraint is binding. Note that setting 
Equating (a22) and (a18) yields
The left-hand side is increasing in N while the right-hand side is decreasing is decreasing in N. Therefore, there exists a unique N for which the Nash-equilibrium patent length coincides with the symmetric desired patent length of Type-II households. When the number of countries exceeds this threshold, even
Type-II households would find the Nash-equilibrium patent length too short. Finally, equating (a22) and , country 1 is worse off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
1. NE refers to the Nash-equilibrium patent length, and the bold lines are the social best response functions of country 1 and country 2.
2. PE refers to the political-equilibrium patent length, and the dotted lines are the SIG best response functions of country 1 and country 2.
3. GO refers to the symmetric globally optimal patent length. 
